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INTRODUCTION  
International humanitarian aid organizations face multiple 
challenges in delivering assistance to at-risk locations throughout the 
world. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States 
increased that burden by generating more restrictive legislation that 
has ultimately inhibited non-governmental humanitarian aid 
organizations from delivering the necessary aid to people living in 
war-torn and poverty-stricken regions. Fear of being prosecuted 
under such laws, for even an inadvertent diversion of resources to a 
foreign terrorist organization (FTO), has been the driving force 
behind the decline in the presence of humanitarian aid organizations 
in areas such as Somalia.
1
 The reticence to engage in areas where 
FTOs operate is significant because of the fundamental role private 
humanitarian organizations play in international aid delivery—they 
are now the primary agencies implementing international 
humanitarian aid programs, and often the impetus behind such 
efforts.
2
 Further, terrorism support laws risk co-opting humanitarian 
 
† Editor in Chief, Maryland Journal of International Law 2012–2013; J.D., University of 
Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, May 2013. The author wishes to thank 
Professor Peter Danchin and Emanwel Turnbull for their invaluable feedback on this 
Comment.   
1. See SARA PANTULIANO ET AL., OVERSEAS DEV. INST., COUNTER-TERRORISM AND 
HUMANITARIAN ACTION: TENSIONS, IMPACT, AND WAYS FORWARD 11 (2011). See generally 
Kate Mackintosh, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project: Implications for Humanitarian 
Action: A View From Médecins Sans Frontières, 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 507 
(2011) (discussing the unforeseen impact that criminal law provisions prohibiting material 
support to terrorists have had on the operations of humanitarian organizations).  
2. Abby Stoddard, Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges and Trends, in HPG Report 14, 
HUMANITARIAN ACTION AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR 25 (Joanna Macrae & Adele 
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aid by preventing aid agencies from giving aid equally, and thereby 
endangering the neutrality of aid agencies.
3
 Although measures that 
prevent the flow of aid to FTOs are a legitimate aspect of domestic 
and international counter-terrorism strategies, it is evident that as 
terrorist support laws become more stringent, humanitarian relief 
efforts suffer in turn.
4
 
This Comment discusses the problems that counter-terrorism 
laws pose to the delivery of humanitarian aid, an aspect of the 
counter-terrorism discussion that is often overlooked. Part I provides 
an overview of the legal framework of international and domestic 
counter-terrorism measures. Specifically, the domestic laws of the 
United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada
5
 are explored 
from a comparative perspective with a focus on the requisite intent 
for criminal liability under the various statutes proscribing support 
for terrorist organizations. The survey illustrates that . . . Part II uses 
Somalia as a case study to exemplify the detrimental impact that 
 
Harner eds., July 2003). It has been estimated that humanitarian NGOs receive a quarter of 
governmental humanitarian spending. Id.   
3. See KATE MACKINTOSH, OVERSEAS DEV. INST., THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMANITARIAN 
ACTION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 8–9 (2000) (explaining that non-
discrimination and neutrality are key principles in the governance of humanitarian aid 
efforts); Priya Shetty, How Important is Neutrality to Humanitarian Aid Agencies? 370 
LANCET 377 (2007) (discussing the importance of neutrality to humanitarian delivery, and 
how it has been undermined by the global war on terror, particularly by Bush’s “with us or 
against us” doctrine). 
4. The chilling effects of these laws have been far-reaching, causing criticism beyond 
the field of humanitarian aid delivery. See, e.g., Michael Price, Robert A. Rubinstein & 
David H. Price, ‘Material Support’ U.S. Anti-Terrorism Law Threatens Human Rights and 
Academic Freedom, 28 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 3, 4 (2012) (“[T]he opacity of the law, 
paired with its potential sweeping scope, makes it almost impossible for anthropologists to 
determine what conduct is permissible.”).  
5. As explained in Part I.B.a, U.S. laws pose the greatest risk to humanitarian efforts. 
The United Kingdom, and Australia were chosen for comparison because, like the United 
States, they are major donor countries with common law legal systems. Their prohibitions on 
the funding of terrorism present a range of approaches to the requisite mens rea, with the 
United States requiring only knowledge of terrorist activity by the fundee, the United 
Kingdom requiring a form of objective recklessness as to the use of funds for terrorism, and 
Australia requiring at least subjective recklessness as to use. See infra Part I.B. The foreign 
rules selected for analysis serve functions equivalent to that of U.S. provisions, namely 
preventing terrorist organizations from receiving funding. This selection is in accordance 
with the functionalist approach. See generally Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of 
Comparative Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 339 (Mathias Reiman & 
Reinhard Zimmerman eds., 2006). In making a functional comparison it is necessary judge 
the success of the laws compared by reference to a factor other than function by which they 
were selected. Id. In this Comment, that factor is the effect of the laws on the ability of 
humanitarian aid organizations to give aid where needed, without excessive fear of legal 
reprisals in their home countries. 
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counter-terrorism measures can have on the delivery of humanitarian 
aid. Part III considers possible responses.  
I. AN OVERVIEW OF MULTILATERAL AND DOMESTIC COUNTER-
TERRORISM MEASURES 
Counter-terrorism laws that impact the delivery of international 
humanitarian aid exist at both an international and domestic level.
6
 
To illustrate the web of regulations that humanitarian aid 
organizations must navigate in this context, the international and 
domestic counter-terrorism laws that bear on aid delivery are 
surveyed below. Among domestic counter-terrorism laws, the U.S. 
material support statute is given particular attention due to the legal 
implications that stem from its strict construction and extraterritorial 
application.  
A. Multilateral Counter-terrorism Regimes 
On September 28, 2001, the UN Security Council unanimously 
adopted Resolution 1373 pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
7
 
Under Resolution 1373, all UN member states are prohibited from 
providing support to groups designated as terrorist organizations.
8
 
Additionally, the resolution establishes certain counter-terrorism 
measures that member states must implement in their own 
jurisdictions.
9
 The measures include prohibiting the funding of 
terrorist activity and “criminaliz[ing] the willful provision . . . , by 
any mean, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their 
territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the 
knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist 
acts.”10 Further, UN member states are obligated to ensure that “any 
person who participates . . . in supporting terrorist acts is brought to 
justice.”11 The UN established the Counter-terrorism Committee, 
consisting of all of the members of the Security Council, to monitor 
 
6. For a discussion of how restrictions on the flow of humanitarian aid can be 
counterproductive to terrorism prevention strategies, see Aloke Chakravarty, Feeding 
Humanity, Starving Terror: The Utility of Aid in a Comprehensive Anti-terrorism Financing 
Strategy, 32 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 295, 295–96 (2010).   
7. S.C. Res. 1373 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). Because Resolution 1373 
was adopted pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, it is binding on all 
member states. See U.N. Charter art. 25.   
8. S.C. Res. 1373 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
9. Id.  
10. Id.  
11. Id. ¶ 2(e).  
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the implementation of Resolution 1373.
12
 Through targeted sanctions 
regimes, the Security Council pursues specific actors.
13
  
B. Domestic Counter-terrorism Regimes 
1. The United States 
a. Economic Sanctions Regime 
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 
(IEEPA) allows the President to institute a wide range of restrictions 
on economic activity in response to “any unusual and extraordinary 
threat . . . if the President declares a national emergency with respect 
to such threat.”14 Shortly following the events of September 11, 
President Bush used his powers under IEEPA to issue Executive 
Order 13224, “Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With 
Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism,” 
which prohibits transactions with individuals and entities that have 
been listed as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs).
15
 The IEEPA 
allows the government to impose both criminal and civil penalties for 
a violation of any license, order, regulation, or prohibition issued 
pursuant to it.
16
 Notably, section 4 of Executive Order 13224 
overrode the humanitarian exception previously provided by § 
 
12. Id.  
13. See S.C. Res. 1267 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 2001) (targeting al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban and affiliated individuals and entities).  
14. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2006). Specifically, under IEEPA, the President may— 
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit— 
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,  
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any 
banking institution, to the extent that such transfers or payments involve 
any interest of any foreign country or a national thereof,  
(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities, by any person, 
or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States; 
(B) investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, 
direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, 
holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, 
importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, 
power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any 
property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any 
interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States. 
Id. § 1702(a)(1).   
15. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R 786 (2001).  
16. 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (2006).   
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1702(b)(2) of the IEEPA
17
 on the basis that donations to persons 
subject to the order would impair the President’s ability to deal with 
the national emergency and endanger the Armed Forces.
18
  
The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC) is responsible the administration of the economic sanctions 
program. OFAC may grant general or specific licenses to private 
parties, which authorize them to engage in transactions that would 
otherwise be prohibited.
19
 However, the processing can be difficult 
and time consuming,
20
 which is particularly problematic for the 
provision of emergency and disaster relief. Additionally, OFAC has 
broad discretion in considering license applications. Licenses are not 
always granted to the humanitarian aid organizations that seek them, 
as discussed below.  
b. Criminal Laws 
Alongside the sanctions regime are criminal laws prohibiting 
terrorist activities. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B was enacted as part of the 
Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),
21
 
and subsequently amended following the attacks of September 11 
with the implementation of the Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act). According the House 
Committee Report, one of the reasons § 2339B was enacted was in 
recognition of 
the fungibility of financial resources and other types of 
material support. Allowing and individual to supply 
 
17. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(2) (2006). Under § 1702(b)(2) of IEEPA, the President does not 
have the authority to “regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly . . . donations, by persons 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of articles, such as food, clothing, and 
medicine, intended to be used to relieve human suffering, except to the extent that the 
President determines that such donations (A) would seriously impair his ability to deal with 
any national emergency declared under [50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006)] . . . or (C) would endanger 
Armed Forces of the United States which are engaged in hostilities or are in a situation 
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.” Id. 
18. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 3 C.F.R 786 (2001).  
19. 31 C.F.R. 501.801(a)-(b). See generally OFAC Frequently Asked Questions and 
Answers, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/answer.aspx#60 (last visited Sept. 15, 2012).  
20. See Hearing on Responding to Draught and Famine in the Horn of Africa Before the 
Subcomm. on African Affairs, S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 35, at 11 (2011) 
(statement of Jeremy Konyndyk, Director of Policy and Advocacy, Mercy Corps).  
21. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1250 (1996) 
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funds, goods, or services to an organization, or to any 
of its subgroups that draw significant funding from the 
main organization’s treasury, helps defray the cost to 
the terrorist organization of running the ostensibly 
legitimate activities. This in turn frees an equal sum 
that can be spent on terrorist activities.
22
 
Under § 2339B, it a crime to “knowingly provide[ ] material support 
or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempt[ ] or 
conspire[ ] to do so . . . .”23 In order to violate the statute one “must 
have knowledge that the organization is a designated terrorist 
organization . . . that the organization has engaged or engages in 
terrorist activity . . . or that the organization has engaged or engages 
in acts of terrorism . . . .”24  
The definition of “material support or resources” is adopted from 
§ 2339A, which defines the term as “any property, tangible or 
intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or 
financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert 
advice or assistance, safe houses, false documentation or 
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal 
substances, explosives, personnel . . . and transportation . . . .”25 
Medicine and religious materials are explicitly excluded from the 
definition of “material support or resources.”26 Violation of § 2239B 
 
22. H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 81 (1995). 
23. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006). Defendants charged with providing material support 
to a foreign terrorist organization have not been successful in attempts to challenge the status 
of the organization at issue as an FTO. See, e.g., U.S. v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 331 (4th 
Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 1051 (2005); U.S. v. Marzook, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1071–
72 (N.D. Ill. 2005).  
24. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006). Under § 2339B, the term “terrorist organization” 
means “an organization designated as a terrorist organization under section 219 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(6) (2006). 8 U.S.C. § 1189 
delineates the procedures by which an organization is designated as a terrorist organization.  
25. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2006).  
26. Id. As one commentator has pointed out, the limited exemption for medicine and 
religious materials means that “it is legal to give someone a pill, but illegal to provide clean 
water for swallowing it.” Material Support and the Need for NGO Access to Civilians in 
Need, CHARITY AND SECURITY NETWORK (July 7, 2010), http://www.charityandsec 
urity.org/analysis/material_support_law. Further, the Second Circuit has held that the 
provision exempting medicine in § 2339A(b)(1) applies to the provision of medicine, but not 
the practice of medicine. U.S. v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 143 (2d Cir. 2011) (reasoning that 
“‘providing medicine’ is how common usage refers to the prescription of a substance or 
preparation to treat a patient . . . [b]y contrast, ‘practicing medicine’ is how common usage 
describes . . . employing the art or science of medicine to treat a patient.”) Thus, an 
organization such as Doctors Without Borders could legally provide antibiotics, but not 
perform a surgery.  
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is punishable by fine and/or imprisonment for up to fifteen years, and 
if the death of any person results, an individual may be imprisoned 
for any term of years or for life.
27
 The statute has broad 
extraterritorial reach.
28
 An individual who has engaged in one of the 
proscribed activities can be charged under § 2239B if that person is 
brought into or found in the United States, regardless of whether he 
or she is an U.S. national.
29
  
c. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 
In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected constitutional 
challenges to § 2339B in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 
(HLP).
30
 Plaintiffs sought to provide aid to the Kurdistan Worker’s 
Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 
which were both designated by the Secretary of State as FTOs in 
1997.
31
 Namely, the plaintiffs wanted provide aid in the form of 
training on how to use humanitarian and international law to resolve 
disputes peacefully, petition representative bodies such as the United 
Nations for relief, and engage in political advocacy on behalf of the 
 
27.18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006).  
28. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d) (2006).  
29. Section 2339B(d) provides for jurisdiction over the offenses listed § 2339B(a) where: 
A.an offender is a national of the United States (as defined in section 
101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 
(a)(22))) or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the 
United States (as defined in section 101(a)(20) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 (a)(20)));  
B.an offender is a stateless person whose habitual residence is in the 
United States;  
C.after the conduct required for the offense occurs an offender is brought 
into or found in the United States, even if the conduct required for the 
offense occurs outside the United States;  
D.the offense occurs in whole or in part within the United States; 
E.the offense occurs in or affects interstate or foreign commerce; or  
F.an offender aids or abets any person over whom jurisdiction exists 
under this paragraph in committing an offense under subsection (a) or 
conspires with any person over whom jurisdiction exists under this 
paragraph to commit an offense under subsection (a).  
Id. § 2339B(d)(1)(A)–(F). 
30. 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). The plaintiffs presented three main challenges to the material 
support statute, arguing that it was (1) impermissibly vague and therefore violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; (2) violated plaintiffs’ freedom of speech under the 
First Amendment; and (3) violated plaintiffs’ freedom of association under the First 
Amendment. Id. at 2716.   
31. Id. at 2713. The challenge was brought as a pre-enforcement review of 18 U.S.C. § 
2339B.   
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organizations’ members.32 The Court ultimately found these activities 
to fall within the scope of the terms “training” and “expert advice or 
assistance” in § 2339B.33 Beyond these enumerated activities, the 
Court did not indicate what other humanitarian activities would 
violate § 2339B because they were not at issue in the case. However, 
it was the government’s position in oral argument that even 
legitimate humanitarian aid to victims of a natural disaster would be a 
crime if a humanitarian NGO engaged with a FTO in the process.
34
 
More significantly for the purposes of this discussion, the 
Supreme Court found that intent to support a terrorist group is not 
required for criminal liability under § 2339B.
35
 According to the 
majority, the requisite mens rea under § 2339B is “knowledge about 
the organization’s connection to terrorism, not specific intent to 
further the organization’s terrorist activities.”36 In contrast, the 
dissent advocated for a different construction, wherein criminal 
liability would arise only “when the defendant knows or intends that 
those activities will assist the organization’s unlawful terrorist 
actions.”37 The majority’s opinion was ultimately shaped by 
 
32. Id. at 2720–21.  
33. Id. at 2720. The HLP case has sparked significant debate over its implications for 
free speech. Some commentators view HLP as a case of twenty-first century McCarthyism. 
See, e.g., David Cole, The New McCarthyism; Repeating History in the War on Terrorism 38 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2003) (likening the approach to the war on terror to 
McCarthyism, and citing the then-pending HLP case as an example of how the material 
support statute imposes guilt by association); Marjorie Heins, The Supreme Court and 
Political Speech in the 21st Century: The Implications of Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, 76 ALBANY L. REV. 561 (2013) (posing the question, “Was the Holder decision a 
prelude to Supreme Court acquiescence in another era of political repression comparable to 
the heresy hunts of the 1950s[?]”). But see Peter Margulies, Advising Terrorism: Material 
Support, Safe Harbors, and Freedom of Speech, 63 HASTINGS L. J. 455 (2012) (defending 
the HLP decision). Others attempt to explain the decision consistent with other recent free 
speech decisions. See, e.g., Patricia Millet et al., Mixed Signals: The Roberts Court and Free 
Speech in the 2009 Term, 5 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 20–23 (2009); Deborah Hellman, Money 
Talks But It Isn’t Speech, 95 MINN. L. REV. 953, 971–73 (2011) (attempting to reconcile HLP 
with jurisprudence on monetary donations as First Amendment speech). 
34. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 
2705 (2010) (No. 08-1498) (discussing how NGO provision of humanitarian aid through an 
FTO following a tsunami could constitute a crime). 
35. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2717.  
36. Id. To highlight the implication of such an interpretation, David Cole, who argued the 
case for the plaintiffs, pointed out that under the majority’s opinion, “when President Jimmy 
Carter did election monitoring in Lebanon, and met with all of the parties to the election—
including Hezbollah, a designated ‘terrorist group’—to provide them with his advice on 
what constitutes a fair election, he was committing the crime of providing ‘material support,’ 
in the form of ‘expert advice.” Advocacy Is Not a Gun, N.Y. TIMES, (Jun. 21, 2010), 
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/21/what-counts-as-abetting-terrorists/.  
37. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2740 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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deference to the determination of Congress and the Executive that 
“providing material support to a terrorist organization—even 
seemingly benign support—bolsters the terrorist activities of that 
organization.”38  
As a consequence of this holding, a threat of criminal liability 
exists regardless of whether the support to a terrorist organization 
flows inadvertently through humanitarian actors, or it is derived from 
individuals intentionally supporting terrorist activities.
39
 All a 
prosecutor must show to establish intent is that the person knew the 
group was listed as a terrorist organization or had engaged in act of 
terrorism.
40
 The holding is significant in light of the realities of 
delivering humanitarian aid—humanitarian actors often operate in 
areas controlled by FTOs and the risk of the diversion of some 
amount of aid is high.
41
 Often it is necessary for humanitarian aid 
organization to have a limited amount of engagement with a FTO in 
order to access civilians in need.
42
  
 
38. Id. at 2728 (majority opinion). It is acknowledged, of course, that the manipulation of 
humanitarian aid is a true problem for charitable operations. There have long been concerns 
about the diversion and misuse of humanitarian assistance to aid both terrorist groups and 
warring factions. See Peter Margulies, Accountable Altruism: The Impact of the Federal 
Material Support Statute on Humanitarian Aid, 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 539, 549 
(2011); see also Typologies and Open Source Reporting on Terrorist Abuse of Charitable 
Operations in Post-earthquake Pakistan and China, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (discussing 
forms of terrorist abuse of charities), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-
illicit-finance/Documents/charities_post-earthquake.pdf. Thus, a real risk exists that 
humanitarian assistance may never reach its intended beneficiaries.  
39. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2717–18. Section 2239B has been used to 
prosecute charitable organizations based in the United States, most notably in the case of 
U.S. v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011). The case concerned the Holy Land 
Foundation (HLF), which held itself out as the largest Muslim charitable organization in the 
United States. Id. at 485. In El-Mezain, HLF and its directors were convicted of providing 
funds to Hamas. Id. However, El-Mezain is not unambiguously one of anti-terrorism laws 
hindering aid efforts: HLF was alleged to operate substantially at the direction of Hamas. Id. 
at 485–89. As discussed, this was not true in the case of Humanitarian Law Project. For a 
discussion of how counter-terrorism laws have impacted Muslim charitable giving, see AM. 
CIVIL. LIBERTIES UNION, BLOCKING FAITH, FREEZING CHARITY: CHILLING MUSLIM 
CHARITABLE GIVING IN THE ‘WAR ON TERRORISM FINANCING’ (2009).  
40. Humanitarian Action Under Scrutiny: Criminalizing Humanitarian Engagement 3 
(Harvard Univ. Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Working Paper, 
2011), available at http://c0186748.cdn1.cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/HPCR%20CHE%2 
02011.pdf.    
41. See infra Part II.  
42. For instance, Hamas has been designated as a terrorist organization by many 
countries, including the United States and those of the European Union. However, the 
interior ministry in Gaza requires an NGO registration fee, and paying such a fee could be 
considered “material support” to Hamas. Mark Tran, Counter-Terrorism Laws Taking Their 
Toll on Humanitarian Action, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 17, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/glo 
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2. United Kingdom 
Unlike U.S. provisions, the United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act of 
2000 was enacted prior to the September 11 attacks, and was 
primarily a consolidation of existing legislation established to address 
domestic terrorism in Northern Ireland.
43
 Under the Act, Criminal 
liability will be imposed if a person "invites support for a proscribed 
organization, and the support is not, or is not restricted to, the 
provision of money or other property . . . .”44 Additionally, “a person 
commits an offense if he arranges, manages or assists in arranging or 
managing a meeting which he knows is . . . to support a proscribed 
organization” or “addresses a meeting and the purpose of his address 
is to encourage support for a proscribed organization or to further its 
activities.”45 One who is found guilty of supporting a listed 
organization faces fines and up to a ten years imprisonment.
46
 
Additionally, criminal liability will be imposed if a person “provides 
money or other property, and knows or has reasonable cause to 
suspect that it will or may be used for the purposes of terrorism.”47 
The law has extraterritorial effect, providing for jurisdiction where “a 
person does anything outside of the United Kingdom,” and would 
have constituted a terrorist financing offense had it been conducted in 
the United Kingdom.
48
 One who is found guilty of such an offense 
may face up to fourteen years imprisonment and a fine.
49
 
3. Australia  
In Australia, one may not intentionally provide training to 
terrorist organizations, make funds available, or provide other support 
or resources to help the organization engage in a terrorist activity.
50
 
Although the act of providing or receiving training must be 
 
bal-development/2011/oct/17/counter-terrorism-laws-impact-humanitarian-action. 
43. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, Explanatory Notes, ¶3-8 (U.K.). 
44. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11, § 12(1) (U.K.). 
45. Id. § 12(2)–(3).  
46. Id. § 12(6).  
47. Id. § 15(3). The mens rea is akin to objective recklessness. CLIVE WALKER, 
BLACKSTONE’S GUIDE TO THE ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION 69 (2002) (“[T]he mens rea for 
[terrorist property] offences . . . requires, as alternatives, knowledge as to purposes or merely 
reasonable (rather than subjective) awareness”). Providing funds to a proscribed organization 
does not automatically fulfill this requirement. Id. (“[T]here is no specific reference in s. 
15 . . . to benefit to proscribed organisations whether for terrorist purposes or not and the 
burden of proof . . . remains on the prosecution.”).  
48. Id. § 63(1). 
49. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11 § 2 (U.K.). 
50. Criminal Code Act 1995, sch 1, s 102.5-7 (Austl.) (as amended). 
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intentional, Australian law merely requires that one be “reckless” as 
to whether the support will contribute to terrorist activities.
51
 Under 
Australian criminal law, “recklessness” requires foresight of a 
substantial risk and taking the risk must be unjustifiable in the 
circumstances.
52
 Additionally, one cannot intentionally associate with 
a terrorist organization where the association provides support to the 
terrorist organization and aids in its continued existence.
53
 However, 
an exemption exists if the association is humanitarian in nature.
54
 No 
similar exemption exists for providing support. All of these offenses 
are subject to broad extraterritorial jurisdiction, which extends “(a) 
whether or not the conduct constituting the alleged offence occurs in 
Australia; and (b) whether or not a result of the conduct constituting 
the alleged offence occurs in Australia.”55  
4. Canada 
Under the Canadian Criminal Code, it is an offense for an 
individual to “knowingly participat[e] in or contribut[e] to, directly or 
indirectly, any activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of 
enhancing the ability of any terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a 
terrorist activity.”56 The offense carries a maximum sentence of ten 
years imprisonment.
57
 The law defines “participating or contributing” 
to include “providing, receiving or recruiting a person to receive 
training [and] providing or offering to provide a skill or an expertise 
for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a terrorist 
group,” among other things.58 However, these activities are only 
considered an offense if undertaken with the purpose of enhancing 
the ability of the proscribed group to engage in terrorist activity.
59
 
Facilitating a terrorist activity is a more serious offense, and carries a 
maximum sentence of fourteen years.
60
 To be found guilty, an 
individual need not be aware that his actions have facilitated a 
 
51. Criminal Code Act 1995, sch 1, s 103.1 (Austl.) (as amended).  
52. Id. s 5.4(2). 
53. Criminal Code Act 1995, sch 1, s 102.7 (Austl.) (as amended). 
54. Criminal Code Act 1995, sch 1, s 102.8(4)(c) (Austl.) (as amended). 
55. Criminal Code Act 1995, sch 1, s 103.3 (Austl.) (providing that extended 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of section 15.4 applies to offenses under the division).  
56. Criminal Code, R.S.C 1985, c. C-46 § 83.18 (2001) (Can.). 
57. Id.  
58. Id.  
59. See id. §§ 83.02–83.04. 
60. Id. § 83.19.   
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terrorist activity.
61
 Moreover, the particular terrorist activity need not 
be “foreseen or planned at the time it was facilitated.”62  
C. Counter-terrorism Measures in Donor Contracts and 
Agreements 
Many states and inter-governmental funding bodies have 
inserted counter-terrorism clauses into donor contracts and 
agreements.
63
 Funding bodies have introduced such clauses with an 
eye to assuring compliance with counter-terrorism laws and policy 
objectives.
 64
 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
began including a clause in grant agreements that reminded 
applicants of the ban on transactions with individuals and 
organizations associated with terrorism in March 2002.
65
 USAID 
now also requires that grant applicants certify that they have not 
provided, within the previous ten years, and will not knowingly 
provide “material support or resources” to a proscribed individual or 
entity.
 66
 For the purposes of the certification, the term “material 
support or resources” has the same definition for that term under 18 
U.S.C. § 2339A(b).
 67
 If a recipient organization learns that it has 
provided material support or resources to a proscribed individual or 
entity, it must notify USAID immediately, and USAID may 
unilaterally terminate the agreement.
68
 According to USAID, even 
USAID employees may be liable under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, § 2339B, 
and § 2339C if they knowingly provide assistance to an organization 
that then provides material support or resources to a proscribed 
organization.
69
 Australian Aid (AusAID), the overseas aid program of 
the Australian government, requires that recipients use their “best 
endeavors” to make sure that funds do not go to support any entity 
 
61. Id  
62. Id.  
63. PANTULIANO ET AL., supra note 1, at 5.  
64. Id.  
65. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE POLICY DIRECTIVE 02-04 
(2002), available at http://transition.usaid.gov/business/business_opportunities/cib/pdf/aapd 
02_04.pdf. 
66. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., ACQUISITION & ASSISTANCE POLICY DIRECTIVE 04-14 
(Sept. 24, 2004), available at http://transition.usaid.gov/business/business_opportunities 
/cib/pdf/aapd04_14.pdf.  
67. Id.  
68. Id.  
69. Id. 
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associated with terrorist, directly or indirectly.
 70
 Moreover, recipients 
are obligated to inform AusAID immediately if “any link whatsoever 
to a proscribed person or entity is discovered.” 71 The U.K. 
Department for International Development (DiFID) similarly retains 
the ability to terminate procurement contracts with overseas suppliers 
for violation of any terrorism law of any country.
72
 DiFID also 
restricts funding to NGOs based on “links” to terrorist groups.73 The 
obligations imposed by these contracts exist independently of the 
laws of the respective governments. 
II. SOMALIA EXEMPLIFIES THE CHALLENGES TO THAT COUNTER-
TERRORISM LAWS POSE TO HUMANITARIAN AID DELIVERY 
Somalia illustrates the problems that counter-terrorism laws pose 
for the delivery of humanitarian aid. Al-Shabab, a designated terrorist 
organization, controls much of southern Somalia. Somalia poses a 
unique challenge for humanitarian aid organizations in light of 
counter-terrorism laws; the difficulty of delivering support to Somalia 
without some of the aid being diverted to al-Shabab has long been 
recognized.
74
 A UN monitoring report indicated that al-Shabab 
extracts between $70 million and $100 million a year in “taxes” from 
relief groups.
75
 The lawlessness, corruption, and conflict in Somalia 
make aid particularly vulnerable to diversion because international 
relief organizations typically utilize local subcontractors to deliver 
 
70. Guidelines for Strengthening Counter-Terrorism Measures in the Australian Aid 
Program, AUSAID, 6 (Sept. 2004), 
http://www.ausaid.gov.au/Publications/Documents/ctm_guidelines.pdf. 
71. Id. at 3. 
72. Dept. Int. Dev., Standard Services Contract – Section 4 Special Conditions, clause 
15.4, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ 
file/143999/contract-section4.doc visited 6/20/2013 
73. See, e.g., Global Poverty Action Fund, Community Partnership Window Guidelines 
for Applicants,¶ 6.2 (May 28, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system 
/uploads/attachment_data/file/205906/GPAF-CP2-Guidelines-28May2.pdf (“We also cannot 
consider applications from any organization which . . . Is linked to any terrorist 
organisations.”); Dept. Int. Dev., Global Poverty Action Fund Impact Window Guidelines 
for Applicants, ¶ 7.8, May 28, 2013, available https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads 
/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/88397/glob-pov-act-fnd-impact-gnt-guide-appls-
merged.pdf visited 6/20/2013 (same). 
74. Mackintosh, supra note 1, at 513 (citing Ken Menkhaus, Stabilisation and 
Humanitarian Access in a Collapsed State: the Somali Case, 34 DISASTERS 320 (2010)). 
75. See Paul Richter, U.S. Eases Aid Restrictions Amid Somalia Famine, LA TIMES, Aug. 
3, 2011, at A6.  
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materials.
76
 Because of this, counter-terrorism laws have had a very 
palpable effect on the delivery of aid to Somalia—observers state that 
funding declined by half between 2008 and 2011, mainly as a result 
of a drop in American contributions stemming from U.S. 
legislation.
77
 
The sanctions imposed on Somalia date back to 1992, when the 
Security Council implemented Resolution 733.
78
 In 2008, the 
Security Council passed Resolution 1844, which added targeted 
sanctions against specific individuals and entities.
79
 The resolution 
required UN member states to prevent resources from being made 
available to a listed individual or entity by making provision of such 
resources a violation of national law.
80
 However, on March 19, 2010, 
the Security Council passed Resolution 1916, which suspended the 
application of Resolution 1844 “to the payment of funds, other than 
financial assets or resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery 
of urgently need humanitarian assistance in Somalia” for a period of 
twelve months.
81
 Resolution 1972, adopted on March 17, 2011, 
renewed the exemption for an additional sixteen months.
82
 While 
these Resolutions would seem to significantly assist in the delivery of 
humanitarian aid to Somalia, the exemption only applies to “the 
United Nations, its specialized agencies or programmes, 
humanitarian organizations having observer status with the United 
Nations General Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance, or 
their implementing partners.”83 Therefore, independent organizations 
do not benefit from the exemption and thus remain exposed to the 
threat of criminal liability.
84
  
Moreover, it has been difficult to obtain OFAC licenses to 
operate in Somalia. U.S. officials have assured relief workers that 
they are not at risk of prosecution for delivering aid to Somali famine 
 
76. U.N. Chairman of the Security Council Monitoring Group, July 18, 2011, U.N Doc. 
S/2011/433, available at www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433. 
77. Mark Tran, supra note 40. 
78. S.C. Res. 733, U.N. Doc. S/RES/733 (Jan. 23, 1992). 
79. S.C. Res. 1844, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1844 (Nov. 20, 2008).  
80. Id. However, unlike Resolution 1373, Resolution 1844 does not specifically require 
that this end be accomplished through the enactment of criminal laws. Compare S.C. Res. 
1844, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1844 (Nov. 20, 2008) with S.C. Res. 1373¶ 1(b), U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
81. S.C. Res. 1916, ¶ 5, U.N Doc. S/RES/1916 (Mar. 19, 2010).  
82. S.C. Res. 1972, ¶ 4, U.N Doc. S/RES/1972.  
83. Id.; S.C. Res. 1916, ¶ 5, U.N Doc. S/RES/1916 (Mar. 19, 2010). 
84. Mackintosh, supra note 1, at 514.  
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victims, and even acknowledged that increased U.S. efforts to ease 
the famine will likely result in an increased diversion of resources to 
al-Shabab.
85
 OFAC has stated that organizations may operate in 
Somalia without a license, and have made assurances that “incidental 
benefits” to al-Shabab, such as food and/or medicine, “are not a focus 
for OFAC sanctions enforcement.”86 Likewise, OFAC has declared 
that payments that an humanitarian organization unintentionally 
makes to al-Shabaab, where the organization did not have reason to 
know it was dealing with al-Shabaab, “would not be a focus for 
OFAC sanctions enforcement.”87 Verbal assurances and informal 
statements do not have the force of law, which relief workers could 
rely on to escape liability should a subsequent administration change 
its mind on the issue. The statements made by OFAC are not a firm 
guarantee that it will not act against an organization, and it will not 
prevent prosecution under the material support statute in the future.
88
 
As a result, humanitarian aid workers in Somalia remain vulnerable 
to liability for legitimate relief operations. 
III. POSSIBLE RESPONSES  
Within the international community, there has been a certain 
amount of concern about the impact of counter-terrorism measures on 
humanitarian relief efforts. A 2009 report by the UN Secretary-
General seemed to aim certain language at domestic counter-
terrorism laws deterring humanitarian efforts, stating “[a]t the 
absolute minimum, it is critical that Member States support, or at 
least do not impede, efforts by humanitarian organizations to engage 
armed groups in order to seek improved protection for civilians—
even those groups that are proscribed in some national legislation.” 
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court decided HLP, the Emergency 
Relief Coordinator/Under Secretary-General from Humanitarian 
Affairs articulated her increasing concern about “the growing body of 
national legislation and policies relating to humanitarian funding 
which limit humanitarian engagement with non-State armed groups 
that have been designated as terrorist organizations,” specifically 
citing the way that the United States had defined “material 
 
85. Richter, supra note 69. 
86. Frequently Asked Questions Regarding Private Relief Efforts in Somalia, OFFICE OF 
FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/S 
anctions/Pages/answer.aspx#som. 
87. Id.  
88. See PANTULIANO ET AL., supra note 1, at 9. 
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support.”89 The Under Secretary-General opined that “[m]easures of 
this sort can take us further, rather than nearer, our goal of protecting 
civilians.
90
 Nevertheless, three years after the HLP decision was 
handed down, a comprehensive solution to the problems posed by 
material support laws has yet to be reached. 
What is to be done to resolve the problems that counter-terrorism 
laws have come to pose for the delivery of humanitarian aid? This 
inquiry presents two issues: (1) what the law ought to be, and (2) 
what the instrument of response ought to be. The most obvious 
solution would be to amend the domestic laws proscribing material 
support for terrorism. Such an amendment might incorporate an 
exception into domestic laws proscribing material support for 
terrorism for legitimate humanitarian activities, which would 
accommodate the realities of aid delivery operations. As an 
alternative to or in addition to this exception, material support laws 
could be amended to clarify or modify the requisite intent for 
criminal liability. A practical construction would be along the lines of 
that advocated by the HLP dissent—criminal liability would arise 
only “when the defendant knows or intends that those activities will 
assist the organization’s unlawful terrorist actions.”91 At a 
multilateral level, one solution may be to create a comprehensive 
treaty that deals with how humanitarian organizations are to approach 
operations in areas controlled by FTOs, particularly for situations 
where a limited amount of engagement with the FTO may be 
necessary. However, in the United States, where material support 
laws are especially restrictive, this would still present problems for 
the perspective of the doctrine of self-execution, a consideration of 
which is outside the scope of this Comment. Regardless of the 
vehicle, a solution that provides a level of predictability to 
humanitarian actors is necessary in order to ensure the continued 
delivery of aid to vulnerable civilian populations. It is possible to 
implement such a solution while maintaining counter-terrorism 
objectives. The provision of humanitarian relief and the 
implementation of counter-terrorism measures need not be mutually 
exclusive.  
 
89. Emergency Relief Coordinator/Under Secretary-General from Humanitarian Affairs, 
Security Council Open Debate on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (Nov. 22, 
2010), http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/ERC%20POC%20Statement%2022Nov2010 
-Final-CheckedAD.pdf. 
90. Id. 
91. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. at 2740 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added).  
14-Gonzalez 8/29/2013  12:37 PM 
328 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [VOL. 28:312 
CONCLUSION 
As this Comment has demonstrated, material support laws pose a 
serious risk for humanitarian aid operations in areas where FTOs are 
present. The restrictive nature of such measures is confirmed by the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project. Due to the broad extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws and the 
influence that the United States carries around the world leading 
counter-terrorism efforts, the impact of this decision is far-reaching. 
And, three years after the decision was rendered, the concerns remain 
unchanged. In response to fears of criminal liability for legitimate aid 
activities, humanitarian aid groups have scaled back their operations 
in areas where there is a high-risk of diversion by a FTO. 
Unfortunately, as in the case of Somalia, these are often the areas that 
need aid most. 
